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THE DOCTRINES of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction' existed for
over seventy years2 before their codification as supplemental jurisdic-
tion in 1990.3 In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,4 the Supreme Court de-
scribed the standard of relatedness for a claim to be supported by
pendent jurisdiction. 5 Under the Gibbs standard, claims which shared
a "common nucleus of operative fact" with the main action and were
such that the plaintiff "would ordinarily be expected to try them all in
one judicial proceeding" were supported by pendent or ancillary juris-
diction. 6 Compulsory counterclaims, which by definition "arise[ ] out
* Class of 2007; B.S., University of California at San Diego. Many thanks to Professor
C. Delos Putz for his inspiration and guidance during the early stages of this Comment.
Thank you also to my editor, Nick Tsukamaki, whose comments and suggestions were
integral to making this Comment what it is today.
1. "The term 'ancillary jurisdiction' has traditionally been used to refer to federal
jurisdiction over claims other than those of the plaintiff, such as compulsory counter-
claims, cross-claims, impleader claims, and the claims of a party intervening as of right."
Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers, 726 F.2d 972, 989 n.48 (3d Cir. 1984). It is "de-
rived from the notion that, once a federal court acquires jurisdiction over property, all
claimants to the property must be able to litigate their claims in that federal court." Id.
Pendentjurisdiction allows federal courts to hear state law claims presented by the plaintiff
that are closely related to the federal claims. Perkins v. Halex Co. Div. of Scott Fetzer, 744
F. Supp. 169, 173 (N.D. Ohio 1990). See discussion infra Part I.A.
2. Ancillary jurisdiction has been in existence since at least 1861, and pendentjuris-
diction since at least 1933. See Ambromovage, 726 F.2d at 989 n.48.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000); Baggett v. First Nat'l Bank, 117 F.3d 1342, 1352-53 n.4
(1 th Cir. 1997). See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (describing
pendent jurisdiction); Ambromovage, 726 F.2d at 989 n.48 (giving a brief history of ancil-
lary jurisdiction).
4. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
5. Id. at 725. The Gibbs standard was later held to apply to ancillary jurisdiction in
Owen Equipment & Electric Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 378-79 (1978).
6. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
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of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the op-
posing party's claim," 7 were held to be supported by ancillary jurisdic-
tion.8 Permissive counterclaims do not arise "out of the same
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim,"9 and require an independent basis ofjurisdiction to be
brought in federal court.10
When ancillary and pendent jurisdiction were codified as supple-
mental jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1367,11 Congress clearly stated that
it meant to codify the "scope of supplemental jurisdiction first articu-
lated by the Supreme Court in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs."' 2 How-
ever, § 1367 does not use the language of Gibbs. Instead, it states that
the court may exercise jurisdiction "over all other claims that are so
related to claims in the action ... that they form part of the same case
or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." 13
This inconsistency between Congress's intention to codify the
Gibbs standard and the actual language of § 1367 has led to a circuit
split as to whether the "same case or controversy" statutory standard is
broader than the Gibbs test, and therefore whether supplemental juris-
diction might also support permissive counterclaims that have some
factual connection to the main claim. 14 Some circuits continue to find
that § 1367 requires permissive counterclaims to have an independent
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a). The definition of a compulsory counterclaim "mirrors the
condition that triggers a defense of claim preclusion (resjudicata) if a claim was left out of
a prior suit." Publicis Commun. v. True North Communs. Inc., 132 F.3d 363, 365 (7th Cir.
1997). Dindo v. Whitney, 52 F.R.D. 194 (N.H. 1971), presents a classic example of a com-
pulsory counterclaim. Id. at 197. In Dindo, the plaintiff automobile passenger sued the
driver for negligence arising out of an accident. Id. at 196. The driver then asserted a
defense of contributory negligence, alleging that the passenger caused the vehicle to crash.
Id. at 197. The driver's claim against the passenger would be a compulsory counterclaim,
since it arises out of the same occurrence (the accident) as the main negligence claim. Id.
8. Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 469 n.1 (1974).
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b).
10. Lesnik v. Pub. Indus. Corp., 144 F.2d 968, 976 n.10 (2d Cir. 1944). For example, if
a borrower defaults on a loan and then sues the lender for discriminatory lending, the
lender's counterclaim for the unpaid balance of the loan would be a permissive counter-
claim. See, e.g., Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205, 209-10 (2d Cir. 2004). Under
the traditional independent basis test, the permissive counterclaim for the unpaid balance
could not be heard in federal court without an independent basis ofjurisdiction, such as
either diversity or federal question. See Oak Park Trust & Sav. Bank v. Therkildsen, 209
F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2000).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000). See infra Part II.B for further discussion on the codifi-
cation of these doctrines.
12. House Report, Judiciary Committee Report on the Judicial Improvements Act,
H.R. Rep. No. 101-734, at 29 n.15 (1990) [hereinafter House Report].
13. 28 U.S.C. § 13 6 7 (a) (2000).
14. See discussion infra Part III.
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basis of jurisdiction. 15 This analysis is consistent with the language in
the legislative history stating that the statute was meant to codify the
scope of supplemental jurisdiction set forth in Gibbs. Other circuits
read the statute literally, and find that the "same case or controversy"
language in § 1367 is broad enough to allow supplemental jurisdic-
tion over permissive counterclaims that would not have been allowed
under the Gibbs test.1 6
In June of 2005, the Supreme Court decided Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Services, Inc.17 Exxon dealt with the application of § 1367 to
claims based on diversity jurisdiction. 18 The Court, relying on a literal
interpretation of the statute, found that § 1367 was "not ambiguous,"
and that there was therefore no need to look to the legislative his-
tory. 19 In Exxon, the Court held that if one named plaintiff satisfies the
amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction, § 1367
authorizes supplemental jurisdiction over "the claims of other plain-
tiffs in the same Article III case or controversy," even if those claims
do not meet the amount in controversy requirement.2 0
Even though Exxon dealt with joinder of parties in diversity cases,
the Court's literal reading of § 1367 strongly supports a literal reading
of the statute with regard to jurisdiction over permissive counter-
claims as well. As stated by one court, "common sense suggests that
courts should interpret the same language in the same section of the
same statute uniformly."21 Thus, when deciding whether to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over permissive counterclaims, the lower
courts will be bound to follow the Supreme Court's literal interpreta-
tion of § 1367 and its refusal to rely on the statute's legislative history.
By following this literal interpretation, they will be forced to exercise
jurisdiction over these claims. In this way, the circuit split over
whether § 1367(a) supports supplemental jurisdiction over permissive
counterclaims would be resolved.
This Comment will examine the development of supplemental
jurisdiction as applied to counterclaims, as well as analyze the circuit
split over whether § 1367 allows for supplemental jurisdiction over
15. See, e.g., Hart v. Clayton-Parker & Assocs., 869 F. Supp. 774, 776-78 (D. Ariz.
1994).
16. See, e.g., Channell v. Citicorp Nat'l Servs., 89 F.3d 379, 385-86 (7th Cir. 1996). See
alsoJones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004).
17. 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005).
18. Id. at 2615, 2625-26.
19. Id. at 2625.
20. Id. at 2615.
21. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 4 (lst Cir. 1997).
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permissive counterclaims. Part II will argue that the Court's interpre-
tation of § 1367 in Exxon, albeit in a diversity context, strongly sup-
ports reading the statute literally with regard to jurisdiction over
permissive counterclaims. This Part will further contend that it would
be inconsistent for the Court to reject § 1367's legislative history in
Exxon and then embrace that same legislative history when deciding
whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over permissive coun-
terclaims. Finally, Part III will discuss the possible implications of fol-
lowing a literal interpretation of § 1367. It will focus on the different
ways that courts can apply § 1367(c), which grants federal courts the
discretion not to hear a claim that supplemental jurisdiction would
otherwise support. In order to provide an example of how this inter-
pretation of § 1367 could affect another area of the law, this Com-
ment will conclude by examining a topic oft-seen in the cases
discussed below: unfair lending and debt collection practices.
I. History and Background: Pre-1990
A. Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction
The hallmark of federal court jurisdiction is that "federal courts
are courts of limited jurisdiction." 22 In order to hear a claim, jurisdic-
tion must be expressly granted by statute and the Constitution.23 How-
ever, once a federal court has original jurisdiction over the matter at
issue, it can exercise ancillary and pendent jurisdiction over other
claims presented in the action, even if those other claims are based on
state law and could not normally be heard in federal court.24
Ancillary jurisdiction traditionally allowed federal courts to hear
state law claims brought by parties other than the plaintiff when based
on the same matter as the original suit.25 Similarly, pendent jurisdic-
tion allowed federal courts to hear related state law claims presented
22. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). See also Owen
Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978) ("It is a fundamental pre-
cept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.").
23. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377.
24. See Perkins v. Halex Co. Div. of Scott Fetzer, 744 F. Supp. 169, 173 (N.D. Ohio
1990) (discussing the court's power under pendent jurisdiction to hear state law claims);
Florida Medical Ass'n. v. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 454 F. Supp. 326, 330 (M.D.
Fla. 1978) (discussing the court's right to exercise ancillary jurisdiction).
25. Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers, 726 F.2d 972, 989 n.48 (3d Cir. 1984)
("Ancillary jurisdiction is derived from the notion that, once a federal court acquires juris-
diction over property, all claimants to the property must be able to litigate their claims in
that federal court .... The scope of ancillary jurisdiction was later expanded to include
cases in which there was no particular 'property' involved, except for the claim.").
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by the plaintiff.26 While pendent and ancillary jurisdiction originated
as two separate doctrines, the Supreme Court eventually held in Owen
Equipment & Electric Co. v. Kroger27 that they were "two species of the
same generic problem."28
These doctrines can be characterized as doctrines of judicial ne-
cessity. Without them, a federal court could not resolve a case present-
ing both federal and state law issues in a single action, since the court
would not be able to hear the state law claims. 29 Pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction thus promote judicial economy and helped avoid unnec-
essary suits by allowing the federal courts to hear federal and state
claims simultaneously 30 The two originated as, and remained, two
separate doctrines until the Court's decision in Owen.
3t
B. Standard of Relatedness: The Gibbs Test
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs laid out the pre-1990 standard that
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction could only support a state law claim
which "derived from a common nucleus of operative fact" as the fed-
eral claim.3 2 In Gibbs, a plaintiff mine superintendent sued a union,
alleging that the union had improperly pressured the company to fire
him.3 3 He brought a federal suit under the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, 34 and a state law claim for unlawful conspiracy to interfere
with his employment contract.35 While the jury found for the plaintiff
on both the federal and state claims, the trial court held that he failed
to establish a federal claim, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 36 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that pendent jurisdiction
26. See Perkins v. Halex Co. Div. of Scott Fetzer, 744 F. Supp. 169, 173 (N.D. Ohio
1990).
27. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
28. Id. at 370.
29. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 379-80 (1994).
30. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 545-46 (1974); Potter v. Rain Brook Feed Co.,
530 F. Supp. 569, 577 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (stating that the doctrines of pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction rest on considerations of fairness and judicial economy).
31. Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978) (describing
ancillary and pendent jurisdiction as "two species of the same generic problem: Under
what circumstances may a federal court hear and decide a state-law claim arising between
citizens of the same State?"). The court in Owen went on to find that the Gibbs standard
represented a constitutional hurdle that must be overcome when considering a claim
under ancillary jurisdiction. Id. at 371-72.
32. 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
33. Id. at 718, 720.
34. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (2000).
35. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 720.
36. See id.
Summer 2006] EXXON v. ALLAPATTAH
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
applied to support state law claims which "derived from a common
nucleus of operative fact" with the federal claim, and were such that
the plaintiff "would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judi-
cial proceeding."37
The Supreme Court clarified the Gibbs standard in a later deci-
sion, where it stated that "[i]f a counterclaim is compulsory, the fed-
eral court will have ancillary jurisdiction over it even though
ordinarily it would be a matter for a state court."38 This implied that
ancillary jurisdiction would not be available to support permissive
counterclaims.3 9 In essence, while compulsory counterclaims met the
Gibbs standard, 40 permissive counterclaims did not satisfy the test, and
were held to require an independent basis of subject matter
jurisdiction. 41
Eventually, the Supreme Court held, as noted above, that pen-
dent and ancillary jurisdiction were "two species of the same generic
problem. ' 42 In Owen, the court found that even though Gibbs con-
cerned a pendent state claim, its reasoning was broad enough to cover
claims arising under ancillary jurisdiction as well.43 "[I]f, considered
without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiffs claims
are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one
judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues,
there is power in federal courts to hear the whole."44 Thus Gibbs oper-
ated as the standard of relatedness for both pendent and ancillary
claims.45
C. Pendent Party Jurisdiction: Finley v. United States
Over the years, a separate issue arose as to whether a party suing
the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FFCA")46
could assert a claim against a third party over whom the court did not
37. Id. at 725.
38. Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 469 n.1 (1974) (citation omit
39. SeeJones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205, 210 (2d Cir. 2004).
40. See Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers, 726 F.2d 972, 990 (3d Cir. 198
41. See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Fidata Corp., 700 F. Supp. 1252, 1265 (S.D
1988).
42. Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978).
43. See id. at 370-71.
44. Id. at 371 (citing United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715
(1966)).
45. In re Cenco, Inc. Sec. Litigation, 601 F. Supp. 336, 343 n.9 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
46. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80 (2000).
tted).
4).
.N.Y.
725
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have jurisdiction. 47 This became known as the "pendent party"
problem. 48
The Supreme Court took up the issue in Finley v. United States.49
In Finley, the plaintiffs husband and children died when their plane
struck electric power lines on its approach to a city-run airfield. 50 The
plaintiff filed a negligence action against the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration under the FTCA,51 which confers federal jurisdiction over
certain civil actions against the United States. 52 The plaintiff amended
her complaint to add state law negligence claims against the city and
the utility company that maintained the power lines.5 3
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia stated that the holding of
Gibbs did not apply to pendent party claims, as the addition of a new
party would run counter to the principle that federal courts are courts
of limited jurisdiction. 54 The Court held that the language of the
FTCA did not confer jurisdiction over third parties,55 and that despite
considerations of efficiency and the convenience of consolidating dif-
ferent actions, the courts could not join pendent parties without a
specific grant of jurisdiction from Congress. 56
While its narrow holding was that the FTCA did not necessarily
authorize federal jurisdiction over pendent parties,57 Finley raised seri-
ous questions about the lack of existing statutory authority supporting
ancillary and pendent jurisdiction. 58 Under the Court's reasoning,
these doctrines would essentially be undone, since they had no statu-
tory basis at the time. 59 Almost as a foreshadowing of what was to
come, Justice Scalia stated that "[w] hatever we say regarding the scope
47. See Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 n.8 (9th Cir. 1977).
48. Stewart v. United States, 716 F.2d 755, 757 (10th Cir. 1982).
49. 490 U.S. 545, 547 (1989).
50. Id. at 546.
51. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80 (2000).
52. Finley, 490 U.S. at 547.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 550.
55. Id. at 552.
56. Id. at 556.
57. Id. at 555-56.
58. See Kelley v. Michaels, 59 F.3d 1055, 1058 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that Finley "had
cast doubt on the authority of federal courts to hear some claims within supplemental
jurisdiction.").
59. Finley, 490 U.S. at 548-49. These doctrines were not codified until 1990, when 28
U.S.C. § 1367 was enacted.
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of jurisdiction conferred by a particular statute can of course be
changed by Congress."60
D. The Codification of Supplemental Jurisdiction
Congress acted quickly to overrule Finley and codify ancillary and
pendent jurisdiction. 6 1 In 1990, one year after the case was decided,
28 U.S.C. § 1367 was enacted to codify the two doctrines under the
umbrella title of "supplemental jurisdiction. '62 This statute provides:
[the federal] courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all
other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or contro-
versy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such sup-
plemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder
or intervention of additional parties.63
The statute further provides that a federal court can decline to
exercise jurisdiction over a claim if
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law, (2) the
claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over
which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district
court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdic-
tion, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compel-
ling reasons for declining jurisdiction.6 4
The legislative history of § 1367 clearly states that it was meant to
"authorize jurisdiction in a case like Finley, as well as essentially restore
the pre-Finley understandings of the authorization for and limits on
other forms of supplemental jurisdiction. ' 65 Congress also intended
the statute to codify the "scope of supplemental jurisdiction first ar-
ticulated by the Supreme Court in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs."66
While Congress intended § 1367(a) to codify supplemental juris-
diction under the Gibbs standard, it did not use the same language
that was used in Gibbs. Section 136 7 (a) states that courts havejurisdic-
60. Finley, 490 U.S. at 556. See also House Report, supra note 12, at 28 (stating that the
Supreme Court in Finley 'virtually invited Congress to codify supplemental jurisdiction").
61. See Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 113 (4th Cir. 2001); Baggett v. First Nat'l
Bank, 117 F.3d 1342, 1352-53 n.4 (11th Cir. 1997).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000). This statute was adopted as section 310 of the Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990. H.R. Res. 5316, 101st Cong., 104 Stat. 5089, 5113 (1990).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The last sentence of subdivision (a) specifically overrules Fin-
ley and allows for joinder of "additional parties." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.,
Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2620 (2005).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). See infra Part V for a discussion of how the courts use this
discretion to decline exercise of jurisdiction over certain claims.
65. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2625 (citing House Report, supra note 12, at 28).
66. Id.
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tion over all claims so related to the claims in the action "that they
form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the
United States Constitution."67 In contrast, under the traditional Gibbs
standard "state and federal claims must derive from a common nu-
cleus of operative fact. But if ... a plaintiffs claims are such that he
would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceed-
ing, then . .. there is power in federal courts to hear the whole.
68
This disparity in language has given rise to a split in the circuit
courts as to the proper interpretation of § 136 7 (a). Specifically, the
courts disagree over whether the statute supports permissive counter-
claims, which would not have been allowed under the Gibbs test.69
II. The Circuit Split: 1990-Present
Courts following both the traditional and literal interpretations
of § 1367 agree that the statute allows for federal jurisdiction over
compulsory counterclaims.7 0 However, two distinct intepretations of
§ 1367 have developed in the circuit courts as to the statute's reach
over permissive counterclaims.
A. The Traditionalist Interpretation
Many circuit courts continue to follow the traditional rule that
while a federal court has supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory
counterclaims, permissive counterclaims require an independent ju-
risdictional basis. 7 1 These courts read § 1367 as nothing more than a
codification of the law as it existed pre-Finley, and as such, have contin-
ued to apply the Gibbs test.
This traditionalist interpretation is exemplified by Hart v. Clayton-
Parker & Associates.72 In Hart, the plaintiff defaulted on her credit card
bill from the J.C. Penney Company and was sent to a collection
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
68. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
69. Circuits were also split over how section 1367 was to be applied to the joinder of
plaintiffs who did not meet the amount in controversy requirement in diversity actions. See
infra Part III.A.
70. See Leipzig v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 362 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that
compulsory counterclaims do not require an independent basis of jurisdiction, but none-
theless embracing the literalist interpretation of § 1367); Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Manuel,
930 F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that compulsory counterclaims are supported
under the traditional interpretation of § 1367).
71. See, e.g., Hart v. Clayton-Parker & Assocs., 869 F. Supp. 774, 777-78 (D. Ariz.
1994); Unique Concepts, 930 F.2d at 574.
72. 869 F. Supp. 774 (D. Ariz. 1994).
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agency. 73 The plaintiff, alleging that the defendant engaged in decep-
tive, unfair and abusive debt-collection practices,7 4 filed suit in federal
court under the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA") 7 5 and under applicable Arizona state law. The defendant
counterclaimed for the amount of debt unpaid. 76
The plaintiff argued that the court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction over the counterclaim, as it did not arise under federal
law and there was no basis for diversity jurisdiction. 77 She further ar-
gued that because her claim focused on the defendant's alleged un-
fair collection practices, and the defendant's claim focused on the
payments made under the contract, the claims did not arise out of the
same transaction or occurrence. 78 Accordingly, the counterclaim was
not compulsory, 79 and would therefore require its own jurisdictional
basis.8 0
The defendant, on the other hand, contended that the counter-
claim was compulsory, as there was a logical relationship between the
complaint and the counterclaim.8 ' It also argued that the court
should exercise jurisdiction over the counterclaim in order to "avoid a
multiplicity of lawsuits. '8 2
The court then found:
[E]ven under section 1367(a), courts must still distinguish between
compulsory and permissive counterclaims: federal courts have sup-
plemental jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims, but permis-
sive counterclaims require their own jurisdictional basis. That is,
section 136 7 (a) itself implicitly recognizes that only a compulsory
counterclaim forms a part of the same case or controversy of the
claim giving rise to federal jurisdiction. Thus, resolution of the
question of the court's jurisdiction over defendant's counterclaim
depends on whether the counterclaim is compulsory or
permissive.8 3
The court also noted that "every published decision directly ad-
dressing the issue in this case has found that FDCPA lawsuits and law-
suits arising from the underlying contractual debt are not compulsory
73. Id. at 775.
74. Id.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 1692-1692o (2000).
76. Hart, 869 F. Supp. at 775.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 776.
81. Id. at 775.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 776 (citations omitted).
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counterclaims. '8 4 It reasoned that even though there were factual con-
nections between the defendant's right to payment and the fairness of
the collection practices, "a cause of action on the debt arises out of
events different from the cause of action for abuse in collecting."
8 5
The plaintiffs FDCPA claim "turn[ed] on the content of defendant's
written demand letters, and the validity of the debt itself [was not]
relevant to [the] plaintiffs case."' 86 As the claims involved "different
legal and factual issues governed by different bodies of law," the court
found that the defendant's counterclaim was not logically related to
the plaintiffs complaint.8 7 The counterclaim was therefore not com-
pulsory,8 8 and the court thus lacked jurisdiction over it.89
B. The Literalist Interpretation
Those courts following a literalist interpretation of § 1367 have
confronted facts similar to those in Hart and come to the opposite
conclusion. The leading example of this approach is Channell v. Cit-
icorp National Services.90 In Channell, automobile lessees filed a class ac-
tion alleging that after their cars were destroyed in accidents, Citicorp
overcharged them to terminate their lease.9 1 Citicorp counterclaimed
for the termination fee under the lease. 92 The trial court found this to
be a permissive counterclaim, and following the traditional belief that
§ 1367 "does not enlarge the federal courts' jurisdiction," dismissed
the claim.9 3
The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that § 1367 gives district
courts supplemental jurisdiction "over all other claims that are so re-
lated to claims in the action within [the court's] original jurisdiction
that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of
the United States Constitution."9 4 The court stated that § 1367 had
superseded past law in a number of ways, such as allowing an action
against a pendent party even when the claim against that party was less
84. Id. at 777.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing Ayres v. Nat'l Credit Mgmt. Corp., No. 90-5535, 1991 WL 66845, at *4
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 1991)).
88. Id. at 777-78.
89. Id. at 778.
90. 89 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 1996).
91. Id. at 381.
92. Id. at 384.
93. Id. at 385.
94. Id. (citing section 1367(a)).
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than the amount in controversy. 95 The Seventh Circuit also cited pre-
vious case law holding that § 1367 had "extended the scope of supple-
mental jurisdiction, as the statute's language says, to the limits of
Article III-which means that '[a] loose factual connection between
the claims' can be enough. 9 6
The court rejected the notion that the distinction between com-
pulsory and permissive should determine the application of supple-
mental jurisdiction over Citicorp's counterclaim, reasoning that the
distinction was based on doctrines of preclusion, and "[n]ow that
Congress has codified the supplemental jurisdiction in § 1367(a),
courts should use the language of the statute to define the extent of
their powers. '9 7 The court went on to state that the class members'
claims were dependent on the same clause of the lease that Citicorp's
counterclaim depended on, and that this counterclaim fell "within the
outer boundary of § 1367(a)." 98 The court then remanded the case to
the district court to use its discretion under § 136 7 (c) to decide
whether to decline or exercise jurisdiction over the claim. 99
The Second Circuit confronted similar facts in Jones v. Ford Motor
Credit Co. 00 and came to a similar conclusion. In Jones, car buyers sued
the company operating their financing plan, alleging that the com-
pany permitted dealers to mark up rates based on subjective criteria,
including race. 101 According to the plaintiffs, African-American buy-
ers had to pay higher rates than similarly-situated Caucasian buyers. 10 2
The defendant alleged that the named plaintiffs were in default on
their loans, and asserted state law counterclaims against them for the
amounts unpaid. 10 3 The plaintiffs then moved to dismiss these coun-
95. Id. (citing Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.
1996)).
96. Id. (citing Baer v. First Options of Chi., Inc., 72 F.3d 1294, 1298-1301 (7th Cir.
1995)).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 387. Section 1367(c) allows the court to "decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if (1) the claim raises a novel or complex
issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over
which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all
claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are
other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2000).
100. 358 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004).
101. Id. at 207.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 207-208.
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terclaims, arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over them. 104
The district court found the counterclaims to be permissive, and
following the traditional interpretation of § 1367, dismissed them for
lacking an independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction. 10 5 The
court then acknowledged the literalist interpretation of § 1367, stating
that "'there [was] some authority to suggest that ... the court should
determine, based on the particular circumstances of the case, whether
it ha[d] authority to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under
§ 136 7 (a)' over a counterclaim, regardless of whether it was compul-
sory or permissive."' 0 6 The district court went on to state that if it was
wrong, and supplemental jurisdiction was applicable to these counter-
claims, it would still use its discretion under § 1367(c) to dismiss
them, since "[t] he claims and counterclaims arise out of the same oc-
currence only in the loosest terms .... There does not exist a logical
relationship between the essential facts [to be proven] in the claim
and those of the counterclaims." 10 7 However, the court did not state
which subdivision of § 1367(c) it was relying upon when dismissing
the claim. 10 8
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed that the counterclaims
were primarily concerned with the plaintiffs' non-payment and not
with any mark-up policy, and thus held them to be permissive. 10 9 It
also found that the facts to prove the claims and the counterclaims
were not so related that solving both together would be judicially
efficient. 110
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit rejected the traditional reading
of § 1367 and stated that supplemental jurisdiction would support the
claims. The court looked at past case law and found that a "reasoned
explanation of why independent jurisdiction should be needed for
permissive counterclaims" was lacking."' It also noted a continual
erosion of the independent basis doctrine even before the passage of
104. Id. at 208.
105. Id.
106. Id. (citing Solow v. Jenkins, No. 98-CV-8726, 2000 WL 489667, at *2 (S.D.N.Y Apr.
25, 2000)).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 209-10.
111. Id. at 210-11.
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§ 1367.112 The court then rejected the traditionalist view of § 1367,
stating that
[t]he explicit extension to the limit of Article III of a federal
court's jurisdiction over "all other claims" sought to be litigated
with an underlying claim within federal jurisdiction recast the juris-
dictional basis of permissive counterclaims into constitutional
terms. After section 1367, it is no longer sufficient for courts to
assert, without any reason other than dicta or even holdings from
the era ofjudge-created ancillaryjurisdiction, that permissive coun-
terclaims require independent jurisdiction.1 13
While the Second Circuit briefly examined the legislative history
of the statute, it did so only to reject it.114 "[T] he provision's legislative
history indicates that Congress viewed the Gibbs 'common nucleus'
test as delineating [the limits of supplemental jurisdiction]."" 5 The
court did not find the legislative history persuasive. Instead, it stated
that Congress' understanding of the extent of Article III was not bind-
ing, nor was the legislative history an independent limit on § 1367's
clear language.116 It reasoned that the test in Gibbs was developed to
limit state law claims that a plaintiff could join with its federal law
claims, and that this rationale was not necessarily applicable to a de-
fendant's counterclaims. 1 1
7
A plaintiff might be tempted to file an insubstantial federal law
claim as an excuse to tie to it one or more state law claims that do
not belong in a federal court. There is no corresponding risk that a
defendant will decline to file in state court an available state law
claim, hoping to be lucky enough to be sued by his adversary on a
federal claim so that he can assert a state law counterclaim.1 1 8
The court went on to find that the counterclaims were sufficiently
related to the underlying claims to constitute the same "case" within
the meaning of Article III, and therefore within the meaning of
§ 1367.119 This relationship came from the simple fact that "[b]oth
the [Plaintiffs'] claim[s] and the debt collection claims originate from
112. Id. at 211-12. This erosion of the independent basis doctrine is illustrated in
Judge Friendly's concurrence in United States v. Heyward-Robinson Co., 430 F.2d 1077,
1088-89 (1970) (Friendly, J., concurring) (arguing against requiring an independent basis
of jurisdiction for permissive counterclaims).
113. Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205, 212-13 (2d Cir. 2004) (footnote
omitted).
114. Id. at 213-14.
115. Id. at 212-13 n.5 (citing House Report, supra note 12, at 29 n.15).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 213-14 n.7.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 213-14.
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the Plaintiffs' decisions to purchase Ford cars."1 20 The court then re-
manded the case to the district court, as the lower court had not
stated which of the § 1367(c) exceptions it had relied on to deny the
claims. 12 1
M. The Supreme Court's Analysis of Section 1367 in Exxon
v. Allapattah
A. Section 1367 and the Amount in Controversy Requirement
Under Diversity Jurisdiction
As previously stated, the primary function of § 1367 was to over-
rule Finley, a case dealing with joinder of pendent parties.1 22 In addi-
tion to the circuit court split over the scope of supplemental
jurisdiction, another split had arisen over whether § 1367 permitted
plaintiffs who did not meet the amount in controversy requirement in
a diversity suit to be joined as long as one plaintiff met the
requirement.
This circuit split over the amount in controversy requirement
arose in an almost identical manner as the split over supplemental
jurisdiction and permissive counterclaims. The Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Snyder v. Harris12 3 and Zahn v. International Paper Co.124 held
that each individual plaintiff or member of a plaintiff class had to
meet the amount in controversy requirement in order to be joined.125
Some courts looked to § 1367's legislative history and found that be-
cause the statute was written to codify pre-existing law, including
amount in controversy rules, each plaintiff still had to separately meet
the $75,000 amount in controversy. 126 Other courts found that § 1367
overruled Zahn by its plain language, and allowed plaintiffs who did
not meet the amount in controversy to be joined, regardless of any
legislative history stating a contrary intent. 27
120. Id. at 214.
121. Id. at 215-16. See discussion infra Part IV for further discussion of the court's dis-
cretion to decline exercise of supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c).
122. See discussion supra Part I.D.
123. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
124. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
125. Snyder, 394 U.S. at 336 (holding that each plaintiff must satisfy the amount in
controversy requirement in a diversity action); Zahn, 414 U.S. at 301 (holding that each
member of a plaintiff class had to satisfy the amount in controversy in a class action based
on diversity).
126. See, e.g., Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631, 638-40 (10th Cir. 1998).
127. See, e.g., Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 383 F.3d 495,506-507 (6th Cir. 2004); Rosmer v.
Pfizer, Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 114 (4th Cir. 2001).
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B. The Factual and Procedural Background of Exxon v. Allapattah
In 2005, the Supreme Court decided Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapat-
tah Services, Inc., in order to resolve the circuit split over whether
§ 1367 permits joinder of plaintiffs who do not meet the amount in
controversy requirement in a diversity action. 128 In Exxon, gas station
dealers filed a class action against the Exxon Corporation. 129 The
plaintiffs alleged that the corporation had been "intentionally and sys-
tematically" overcharging dealers for fuel.130 Although the case was in
federal court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction, some of the unnamed
class members did not meet the amount in controversy
requirement. 13 1
After a unanimous jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, the dis-
trict court certified the case for interlocutory review to determine
whether it had properly exercised jurisdiction over the plaintiffs who
did not meet the amount in controversy requirement. 132 The Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the extension of
jurisdiction. 13 3
The Supreme Court also decided a companion case in the same
opinion. In Rosario Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc.,134 the issue was
whether family members with claims less than $75,000 could join in a
personal injury suit as long as one plaintiff had claims in excess of
$75,000.135 In Ortega, a nine-year-old girl sued Star-Kist after receiving
unusually severe injuries when she sliced her finger on a tuna can. 136
Her family joined in the suit, seeking damages for emotional distress
and medical expenses.' 37 The plaintiffs filed suit in federal court
based on diversity jurisdiction.138
Finding that none of the plaintiffs met the amount in controversy
requirement, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendant. 139 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed
in part, finding that the girl, but not her family members, had met the
128. 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2615 (2005).
129. Id. at 2615.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2616.
134. 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005).
135. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2616.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
[Vol. 41
amount in controversy. 40 The Court in Rosario held that § 1367 did
not authorize supplemental jurisdiction unless all the plaintiffs met
the amount in controversy. 41
C. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of Section 1367
In Exxon, the Supreme Court began by examining the state of the
law before the enactment of § 1367 in 1990.142 The Court character-
ized § 1367 as allowing for "a broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction
over other claims within the same case or controversy, as long as the
[original] action is one in which the district courts would have origi-
nal jurisdiction." 143 It reasoned that once the complaint contains a
claim satisfying the amount in controversy requirement, there is origi-
nal jurisdiction over that claim. 144 "The presence of other claims in
the complaint, over which the district court may lack original jurisdic-
tion, is of no moment. If the court has original jurisdiction over a
single claim in the complaint, it has original jurisdiction over a 'civil
action' within the meaning of § 1367(a) ....
Because there was original jurisdiction over one claim, the Court
found that it had jurisdiction over the entire civil action, regardless of
the presence of other parties whose claims did not meet the amount
in controversy requirement. 146 The Court went on to hold that § 1367
"authorized supplemental jurisdiction over all claims by diverse par-
ties arising out of the same Article III case or controversy, subject only
to enumerated exceptions not applicable in the cases now before
us."1
4 7
The Court then addressed the legislative history of § 1367. It
found that the statute was not ambiguous and that it was unnecessary
to look at "other interpretative tools, including the legislative
history .... "148
Notwithstanding the irrelevance of the legislative history, the
Court examined it for the sake of argument. It looked at part of the
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2617-20.
143. Id. at 2620.
144. Id. at 2620-21.
145. Id. at 2620-21.
146. Id. at 2620-21.
147. Id. at 2625. The other enumerated exceptions referred to are found in section
1367(b), which the court found did not apply. Section 1367(b) is a codification of the
principal holding of Owen Equipment & Electric Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 (1978), and
only applies in diversity actions. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2625.
148. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2625.
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House Report, which stated that § 1367 would "authorize jurisdiction
in a case like Finley, as well as essentially restore the pre-Finley under-
standings of the authorization for and limits on other forms of supple-
mental jurisdiction." 49 The Court found that according to this report,
§ 1367(a) "'generally authorizes the district court to exercise jurisdic-
tion over a supplemental claim whenever it forms part of the same
constitutional case or controversy as the claim or claims that provide
the basis of the district court's original jurisdiction,' and in so doing
codifies Gibbs."150
The Court did not follow the view that the legislative history
shows the statute did no more than codify Gibbs and overrule Finley.151
It also criticized reliance on legislative history to analyze an unambigu-
ous statute. 152 The court further found that the legislative history was
ambiguous regarding whether § 1367 did more than simply codify the
state of the law before Finley.1 53 This was due to a Subcommittee
Working Paper's acknowledgement that the statute may overrule
Zahn's holding that each member of a plaintiff class had to satisfy the
amount in controversy in a class action based on diversity. 154 The
Court also looked at the statements of three law professors who
worked on the drafting of § 1367 and observed that the law "on its
face" could overrule Zahn.' 55 The professors conceded that "if one
refuses to consider the legislative history, one has no choice but to
'conclude that section 1367 has wiped Zahn off the books.' "156 The
Court thus found that
there exists an acknowledgment, by parties who have detailed, spe-
cific knowledge of the statute and the drafting process, both that
the plain text of § 1367 overruled Zahn and that language to the
contrary in the House Report was a post hoc attempt to alter that
result. One need not subscribe to the wholesale condemnation of
legislative history to refuse to give any effect to such a deliberate
effort to amend a statute through a committee report. 157
149. Id. at 2625 (citing House Report, supra note 12, at 28).
150. Id. (citing House Report, supra note 12, at 28-29).
151. Id. at 2625-26.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2627.
154. Id. at 2626 (citing Report to the Federal Courts Study Committee of the Subcom-
mittee on the Role of the Federal Courts and Their Relation to the States, 561 at n.33
(Mar. 12, 1990)).
155. Id. at 2627 (citing House Report, supra note 12, at 27 n.13).
156. Id. at 2627 (citing Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Stephen B. Burbank & Thomas M. Men-
gler, Compounding or Creating Confusion about Supplemental Jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor
Freer, 40 EmORY L.J. 943, 960 n.90 (1991)).
157. Id. at 2627.
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In this way, the Court held that the legislative history was not con-
trolling and that § 1367 on its face overruled Zahn and allowed for
federal court jurisdiction in circumstances that would not have been
allowed pre-1990.1 58
D. The Applicability of Exxon to Permissive Counterclaims
While this Comment is concerned with the application of
§ 1367(a) to supplemental jurisdiction, § 1367(a) also governs the
rules regardingjoinder of parties in diversity actions.1 59 Moreover, the
legislative history at issue in Exxon is also at issue in the split over the
applicability of supplemental jurisdiction to permissive counter-
claims. 160 In both circuit splits, courts either follow the legislative his-
tory to find that the law has not changed since 1990-thus finding
that supplemental jurisdiction does not apply to permissive counter-
claims-or they look to the plain language of § 1367 to reason that
the rule does allow for jurisdiction over these claims.
Another look at the reasoning of Channell and Jones leads to this
conclusion. The court in Channell declined to follow the previously
used "independent basis" standard in light of the enactment of
§ 1367.161 The Second Circuit in Jones took a deeper look at the legis-
lative history, yet came to the same conclusion: given the statutory lan-
guage in § 1367, supplemental jurisdiction can now support a
permissive counterclaim.1 62 Likewise, the Supreme Court in Exxon ex-
amined the legislative history of § 1367 and came to the conclusion
that the standard had changed due to the plain language of the stat-
ute, despite Congress' possible intent to do nothing more than codify
existing law.
158. Id. at 2615.
159. While the main reason behind the enactment of § 1367 was to overrule Finley, a
case regardingjoinder of pendent parties, the statute also effectively codified the doctrines
of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction. Thus, § 1367 dictates rules regarding both supple-
mental jurisdiction and joinder of parties in diversity actions. See discussion supra Part I.D.
160. See Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2625 (discussing the legislative history of § 1367 as it relates
to United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966));Jones v. Ford Motor Credit
Co., 358 F.3d 205, 212-13 n.5 (2d Cir. 2004) (also discussing the legislative history of
§ 1367 as it relates to Gibbs).
161. The court in Channell refused to extend its decision in Unique Concepts Inc. v. Ma-
nuel, 930 F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1991), which held that a permissive counterclaim based
on state law requires an independent basis ofjurisdiction, to cases under § 1367. See Chan-
nell v. Citicorp Nat'l Servs., 89 F.3d 379, 385 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Now that Congress has
codified the supplemental jurisdiction in § 1367(a), courts should use the language of the
statute to define the extent of their powers.").
162. Jones, 358 F.3d at 212-14.
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It follows that if the Supreme Court rejects the legislative history
of § 1367 when examining joinder of parties in a diversity context, the
same legislative history of that statute would also be rejected when
dealing with supplemental jurisdiction. A different holding would
lead to a situation where the court rejects the legislative history of the
statute in one instance, but embraces the same legislative history of
the same statute in another.
When interpreting a statute, a court will not examine extrinsic
material, such as legislative history, unless it "shed[s] a reliable light
on the enacting Legislature's understanding of otherwise ambiguous
terms."163 In Exxon, the court stated that "§ 1367 is not ambiguous,"
and thus did not follow the legislative history. 164 While this statement
pertained specifically to joinder of parties in diversity actions, it was
referring to §1367(a)-the same statute that governs supplemental ju-
risdiction over permissive counterclaims.1 65 "[C]ommon sense sug-
gests that courts should interpret the same language in the same
section of the same statute uniformly."1 66 In order to reach an oppo-
site result, the court would have to contradict its previous statement
that §136 7 (a) is unambiguous, and then rely on the same legislative
history it had previously found did not control in Exxon.
In this way, the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 1367 in Ex-
xon is equally applicable in the context of supplemental jurisdiction
over permissive counterclaims. As such, the Court's reading of § 1367
in Exxon, paired with the analysis of § 1367 in Channell and Jones,
strongly supports the contention that § 1367 should be followed ac-
cording to its plain language, regardless of any legislative history
which may lead to a contrary result.' 67 Permissive counterclaims no
longer need an independent basis ofjurisdiction-they are supported
by supplemental jurisdiction so long as they are so related to the origi-
nal claim that they make up the same case or controversy under Arti-
cle III. While it has not been decided if the "loose factual connection"
test of Channell will define this standard, it certainly seems that the
independent basis test has been invalidated.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2625-27.
165. See discussion supra Part III.A.
166. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997).
167. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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IV. The Effect of Exxon on Permissive Counterclaims, the
Court's Discretion Under Section 1367(c), and a
Brief Look at Debt Collection Law.
It is unclear what effect the change suggested by Exxon will have
on future federal court litigation involving permissive counter-
claims. 168 However, a brief examination of lending and debt collec-
tion law-a familiar topic in the cases already discussed-may provide
some guidance. An analysis of these cases demonstrates how exercis-
ing jurisdiction over permissive counterclaims with a "loose factual
connection" to the main claim may affect other areas of the law. It
also provides an opportunity to consider the importance of § 1367(c),
which grants courts the discretion to decline jurisdiction over a claim
that would otherwise be supported by supplemental jurisdiction.
Both Channell and Jones dealt with similar factual situations. In
each, a borrower defaults on a loan and then files a complaint against
the lender on the terms of the contract. 169 The lender then files a
counterclaim for the unpaid balance on the loan. 170 The courts in
Channell and Jones found such a counterclaim to be permissive under
§ 1367.171 Even though it would not have been allowed under the in-
dependent basis test, 172 these courts found that the counterclaim was
sufficiently related to the main claim such that supplemental jurisdic-
tion could be exercised.173
This new reading of § 1367 could be a significant deterrent to
suit in cases involving unfair lending and debt collection. 174 Plaintiffs
who might otherwise bring suit for unfair lending or debt collection
practices may hesitate if doing so would expose them to a counter-
claim for debt they are unable to pay. 175 While many states undoubt-
168. The Supreme Court did not rely on the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), Pub.
L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005), in its decision in Exxon, nor did it consider the ramifications of
its decision in light of CAFA's enactment. "CAFA... has no impact, one way or the other,
on our interpretation of § 1367." Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2627. The effect of CAFA on § 1367 is
beyond the scope of this article. For an in-depth look at the possible effects of Exxon on
CAFA, see Gregory P. Joseph, Federal Class Action Jurisdiction After CAFA, Exxon Mobil and
Grable, 8 DEL. L. REv. 157 (2006).
169. SeeJones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205, 207-208 (2d Cir. 2004); Chan-
nell v. Citicorp, 89 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 1996).
170. See Jones, 358 F.3d at 207-208; Channell, 89 F.3d at 384.
171. See Jones, 358 F.3d at 208; Channell, 89 F.3d at 385.
172. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the independent basis test.
173. See Channell 89 F.3d at 385; Jones, 358 F.3d at 213-214.
174. Sparrow v. Mazda Am. Credit, 385 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2005).
175. Id.
Summer 2006] EXXON v. ALLAPAT TAH
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
edly have fair lending and collection laws, 176 and many retain a means
to enforce these laws independent of private suit,1 77 decisions such as
those in Channell and Jones, which allow creditors to counterclaim for
the underlying debt, could keep plaintiffs from bringing their claims
in federal court. 178
However, the post-Exxon interpretation of § 1367 does not man-
date such a result. Even if the counterclaim has the requisite "loose
factual connection" to the underlying claim in order to sustain juris-
diction under § 1367(a), the trial court still has discretion under
§ 1367(c) to decline to hear the claim. 179 For example, under
§ 1367(c) (2), a court can decline to hear a counterclaim that "sub-
stantially predominates" over the claim over which the district court
has original jurisdiction.1 80 Also, § 1367(c) (4) allows a court to de-
cline jurisdiction in "exceptional circumstances."1 81
The appellate courts in both Channel and Jones remanded their
respective cases so that the trial court could examine the counterclaim
under § 1367(c). Both courts stated that § 1367(c)(2) and
§ 1367(c) (4) may apply, and both left instructions for the trial court
on how to apply these sections.182 The court in Jones expressed doubt
that the trial court should decline jurisdiction, stating that under
§ 1367(c) (2), it should "take into account [other] methods by which
the class action might be managed in order to prevent the state law
counterclaims from predominating."'8 3 The same court also stated
that under § 1367(c) (4), in order to decline jurisdiction over the
counterclaim, the trial court must "identify truly compelling circum-
stances that militate against exercising jurisdiction."' 84 The court in
Channell admitted that the case presented exceptional circumstances,
and opined that a compelling argument for declining to hear the
claim may exist. 185 On the other hand, it stated that "[i] t may turn out
176. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 4970-4978.6 (West 2006) (regulating predatory lend-
ing practices in home mortgage lending).
177. Id. § 4975 (granting a licensing agency power to enforce the law).
178. The court in Channell discussed the reasons it exercised jurisdiction over the cred-
itor's counterclaim. Channell, 89 F.3d at 386-87 ("Plaintiffs cannot expect a court to toler-
ate evasion of lawful debts.").
179. See discussion supra Part I.D.
180. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2) (2000).
181. Id. § 1367(c) (4).
182. SeeJones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004); Channe, 89 F.3d
at 387.
183. Jones, 358 F.3d at 215-16.
184. Id. at 215.
185. Channell, 89 F.3d at 387.
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that entry ofjudgment on the counterclaim requires little more than a
mechanical calculation; if so, § 1367(c) would notjustify relinquishing
jurisdiction."] 86
Other jurisdictions have approached the issue differently and ex-
panded the scope of such judicial discretion. Sparrow v. Mazda Ameri-
can Credit187 offers an example of a court declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a permissive counterclaim for "compel-
ling reasons" under § 1367(c) (4).188 In Sparrow, the plaintiff sued a
debt collection company for unfair debt collection practices under
the FDCPA. 189 The company counterclaimed for the amount of the
unpaid debt under state law. 190 Prior to Exxon, it had been established
that in FDCPA actions, a counterclaim for the unpaid debt was per-
missive, and therefore required an independent jurisdictional basis in
order to be brought in federal court.19' The court followed this estab-
lished law and, citing Channell, considered whether it should exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the counterclaim.1 92
The court found that there was a loose factual connection be-
tween the claims, and that the counterclaim could therefore be sup-
ported under a Channell approach to supplemental jurisdiction. 193
However, it declined to exercise such jurisdiction under
§ 1367(c) (4).194 It stated that "strong policy reasons favor declining to
exercise [supplemental] jurisdiction" in suits for unfair debt collec-
tion practices, since allowing the counterclaims would deter litigants
from pursuing their rights under the FDCPA.1 95 Quoting well-estab-
lished debt collection law, the court found that
[t]o allow a debt collector defendant to seek to collect the debt in
the federal action to enforce the FDCPA might well have a chilling
effect on persons who otherwise might and should bring suits such
as this. Moreover, it would involve this Court in questions of no
federal significance. Given the remedial nature of the FDCPA "and
the broad public policy which it serves, federal courts should be
loath to become immersed in the debt collection suits of... the
186. Id.
187. 385 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (E.D. Cal. 2005).
188. Id. at 1070-71.
189. Id. at 1065.
190. Id. at 1068.
191. Leatherwood v. Universal Bus. Serv. Co., 115 F.R.D. 48 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
192. Sparrow, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 1066-67.
193. Id. at 1070.
194. Id. at 1070-71.
195. Id. at 1071.
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target of the very legislation under which" a FDCPA plaintiff states
a cause of action.196
The court went on to state that "[a] major purpose of the FDCPA
is to protect individuals from unfair debt collection practices regard-
less of whether the individual actually owes a debt.' 1 7 On this basis,
the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the com-
pany's counterclaim under § 1367(c) (4).198
While the Supreme Court's decision in Exxon strongly supports
the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over permissive counter-
claims, the lower federal courts are by no means locked into the
§ 1367(c) discretionary rule set forth in Jones. Indeed, it seems that
courts applying § 1367(c), at least in debtor/creditor cases, can still
use their discretion to decline exercise of jurisdiction over these
claims. 199
V. Conclusion
After examining the Supreme Court's analysis of § 1367 in Exxon,
it seems clear that the literalist interpretation of the statute as ex-
pressed in Channell and in other circuits must be followed. Exxon held
that § 1367, by its plain language, overruled Zahn and allowed plain-
tiffs who did not meet the amount in controversy requirement to join
a suit. Likewise, as stated in Channell, the plain language of § 1367 also
overruled the independent basis doctrine. Permissive counterclaims
are supported by supplemental jurisdiction so long as they are so re-
lated to the original claim that they make up the same case or contro-
versy under Article III.
196. Id. (citing Leatherwood, 115 F.R.D. at 50).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1070-71.
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